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Winston Churchill once said that most strategic failures in war are due to the
“total absence of one directing mind and commanding willpower.” During
World War II, Churchill was determined to be that one directing mind, taking
for himself a new cabinet portfolio for defense as well as the office of prime min-
ister. Difficult as it may be to resist the ideas of one of the greatest leaders of the
twentieth century, there are many today who will be skeptical of such a claim.
The literature of contemporary international relations (for all its hard-fought
differences) is united when considering leadership as secondary in importance
to military or political success. Realists believe the most important factor to be
the unique strategic logic of each situation that imposes itself on world leaders.
Liberals emphasize it is the power of institutions that shape ideas. Constructivists
point to cultural and historical factors, or to the dynamics of collective psychology.1
In the narrower sphere of military affairs, the picture is not very different. For
example, in Military Misfortunes (1991), Eliot Cohen and John Gooch criticize
the tendency to blame strategic failure on the commander (the “man in the
dock”) and emphasize instead the central role of dysfunctional military organi-
zation.2 (Debunking leadership in the academic studies of war is hardly new.)
The distinguished British historian Michael Howard, in his well known paper
on “the forgotten dimensions of strategy,” for example, argues that the logis-
tics, technological, and social dimensions of military success have been system-
atically neglected and undervalued when compared to the operational dimension,
in large part because of the myth of glamour of the commander in the field.3
In professional military studies, the great captains of history continue to hold
a place of honor, and military education maintains its traditional concern with
practical leadership issues. Yet even in today’s military,
the standing of leadership is becoming increasingly pre-
carious. For many, the revolution in military affairs
(RMA) validates Howard’s emphasis on the techno-
logical dimension of strategy rather than the opera-
tional. Though rarely directly saying so, proponents of
the RMA presume that leadership will inevitably be-
come irrelevant as technology increasingly takes over
that function.
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The Gulf War is of particular interest here. In spite of much subsequent
self-congratulation over the allied flanking maneuver that broke the Iraqi Re-
publican Guards, what was most impressive and decisive in sober retrospect
for the allied victory happened in the dimensions of logistics and technology,
not in operations. Indeed, it could be argued that the war’s outcome fore-
shadowed for future wars how unimportant operational art and military
leadership are becoming.
But did it? Let us look more closely at the Gulf War. The failure of the flanking
maneuver to close the ring on the Republican Guards clearly reflected a failure of
operational art and leadership at senior command levels, which greatly impacted
the war’s strategic outcome. Also, at the level of political-military decision mak-
ing, a series of errors compounded this failure. The premature halt of the
ground war for ill-considered public relations reasons, the signaling of the U.S.
intent to withdraw from Iraq without a quid pro quo, the abandonment of the
Kurds and Shiites, and more generally, the obvious absence of any serious plan-
ning for the war’s endgame—all helped turn a stunning feat of arms into some-
thing considerably less than a strategic victory.4
Even a cursory review of the recent record of American military actions sug-
gests that this state of affairs is not the exception. From Lebanon and Somalia to
Bosnia and Kosovo, American political and military leadership has too often
been operationally inadequate and unsure, internally divided, and shortsighted
in its strategic decision making.
Rarely has the world sensed in Amer-
ican councils the presence of “one
directing mind and commanding
willpower.” At the same time, there
are few signs that the military-tech-
nical revolution is easing the requirements for leadership at senior command
levels. Recent U.S. military actions in Iraq, as well as in Kosovo, point to the futil-
ity of RMA-style precision bombing, absent appropriate operational concepts
and serious thought about strategic outcomes. Technology cannot substitute
for an appreciation of the logic of war; the responsibility of senior military
leaders becomes that much greater when the logic of war is lacking in civilian
decision makers. It is not even clear that the dynamics of the contemporary
battlefield are reducing the scope of command authority. A good case can be
made that the evolving technologies are at least as likely to recentralize control at
relatively senior echelons.5
What exactly is the relationship between strategy and leadership? Searching
for a productive way to come to grips with this large question, one could do
worse than consult ancient history. The word “strategy” is derived from the
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classical Greek, strategia, which does not mean strategy as we define it but “gener-
alship,” or “leadership of the army,” or more literally, “leading out the people in
arms.” (In contrast, “tactics” refers to drawing up an army in battle formation.)
Several points can be made here. First, strategy is not only a military function;
the ancient Greeks saw little distinction between military and political leader-
ship.6 Second, strategy is less about operational maneuver than about motivat-
ing and disciplining citizen-soldiers. In classical Greece, to borrow Howard’s
terms once more, the key to strategy was not the operational, logistic, or techno-
logical dimension but the social dimension. This is apparent in Thucydides’ fa-
mous account of the Peloponnesian War. His history is short on details of mili-
tary operations (not to speak of logistics or technology), but he has taken great
pains to record speeches made by generals and politicians designed to encourage
troops in the field or to persuade citizens at home to support particular policies
or courses of action. Third and finally, it is noteworthy that the Greeks also did
not distinguish between strategy and diplomacy. In an age that lacked estab-
lished diplomatic services, generals abroad necessarily played the ambassador’s
role, making friends and influencing people as they marched.
Obviously war is infinitely more complicated and technical now than it was
2,500 years ago—because of the reason just discussed, because of its sheer scale,
and because it requires a much higher level of organization, teamwork, and dis-
cipline. However, none of this obviates the need for leadership. In fact, today
leadership is all the more important.
In contemporary states, leadership is a vital strategic function for two rea-
sons. First, it is essential to control and correct astrategic tendencies of modern
military organizations; and second, it plays a key role in countering the astrategic
tendencies of modern governments and societies.
Cohen and Gooch are certainly right to pinpoint organizational dysfunction
as a prime cause of strategic failure. Organizational routines, service rivalries,
the dominance of managerial perspectives, etc., often make contemporary de-
fense establishments highly resistant to strategic rationality. The United States
recognizes these problems and has made major changes in its defense organiza-
tion (the Goldwater-Nichols reform legislation of 1986) that center on strength-
ening the leadership role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Recent U.S.
history has shown, however, that such problems call for continuing leadership
from outside the ranks of the military as well.7 The tendency for military estab-
lishments to develop a strong corporate identity and outlook is also well known.
Therefore, informed and vigorous civilian leadership is essential, not only to en-
sure basic civilian control but also to maintain a genuinely strategic perspective
and to facilitate broader cooperation between military organizations and other
elements of the bureaucracy in common strategic enterprises.
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Perhaps less well known is the requirement for strong leadership as a counter-
weight to the astrategic tendencies of contemporary government and society,
particularly in the United States. As Alexis de Tocqueville put it almost two
hundred years ago in his great work Democracy in America, “Democracy finds it
difficult to coordinate the details of a great undertaking and to fix on some plan
and carry it through with determination in spite of obstacles. It has little capac-
ity for combining measures in secret and patiently waiting for the result. Such
qualities are more likely to belong to
a single man or an aristocracy. But
these are just the qualities which, in
the long run, make a nation prevail.”8
Planning, coordination, secrecy, and
patience tend to be in short supply in
ordinary democratic politics, and it
is the particular burden of the democratic leader to provide or facilitate them.
More important, the democratic leader, whether political or military, has the
equally difficult task of reconciling these requirements with the openness and
accountability of a democratic government. (This is where the classical model of
strategy or generalship may have some further relevance.)
Central to democratic leadership, particularly in time of war, is the task of
persuasion, motivation, and inspiration. In a modern bureaucratic state, this
task extends beyond the public to the legions of soldiers and civilians on which
the government must depend for the implementation of its policies. In order to
perform effectively, leaders (especially, though not only, political leaders) argu-
ably need four qualities: an understanding of their country and its history; an
understanding of the strategic environment they face, and of their actual and
potential adversaries; a vision of the future; and an ability to communicate.
Churchill’s possession of all four qualities explains why he was the great leader
that he was.9
However, the example of Churchill is likely to discourage as much as inspire,
or else strike us as simply irrelevant. After all, the present strategic environment
is very different from that of Churchill’s. It is one thing to call for “one directing
mind and commanding willpower” to lead a nation in total war, but quite an-
other to apply it during an era of ambiguous threats and politically constrained
military operations. Under such circumstances, what may be required is not so
much a leader but rather someone who is skilled at crafting compromise and
consensus at home and abroad.
Churchill’s dictum points out several important problems that currently
confront U.S. leaders. One is the pluralism in national security policy making,
the result of the constitutional structure of the American government, as well as
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certain developments of the last three decades that have strengthened the policy
role of Congress. (Let it be said here that there is much left to do. Reforming the
internal structures of Congress, rationalizing legislative authorities for various
executive branch national security activities [the War Powers Act and perhaps
even the National Security Act of 1947, for example], and repairing execu-
tive-legislative relations could have large payoffs for American policy. Although
such steps are often dismissed as hopeless, it is far from clear why. The relatively
benign international environment of the present offers a good opportunity to
address these sorts of legal and institutional issues.)10
Another is the uncertain relationship between military and civilian authority
within the executive branch. Although the alarmists have recently gained
ground, when discussing U.S. civil-military relations today one should be con-
cerned with the growing estrangement and lack of communication between the
military and its civilian leaders, and with the continuing difficulties that the U.S.
government as a whole encounters in
articulating coherent doctrine for
the use of force and in applying force
with strategic effect.11 While part of
the problem is philosophical, much is a reflection of the clash between military
and civilian cultures and their failures to craft new organizational solutions to
the novel challenges of contemporary limited warfare and operations other
than war. It is, therefore, a prime leadership issue, on both sides.
Finally, a few remarks may be in order concerning the personal dimension of
leadership. It is often said that leaders are born and not made; there is no doubt
of this. On the other hand, it is also a convenient excuse for not thinking very
hard about how one finds, recruits, trains, and manages the careers of potential
leaders. In particular, it is an excuse for ignoring the central but too often ne-
glected issue of the intellectual (as distinct from the personality-based) require-
ments of leadership. In the business world, there has long been a tendency to
separate leadership from substantive knowledge of a particular business sector
or kind of enterprise, though the limitations of such an approach are by now
frequently acknowledged. While perhaps not as pronounced, this tendency can
also be seen in the political world and in government itself. What exactly do our
leaders need to know to be strategically effective? We have only to pose this ques-
tion to realize that an Ivy League education today gives little consideration to the
subject; even a professional military education offers no guarantee.
A further point: good leaders do not necessarily make good strategists, and
good strategists are not always effective leaders. The qualities that Churchill listed
are more typically scattered among several individuals. From this perspective, the
management of personnel and decision-making systems, both civilian and
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military, must be seen as an integral aspect of strategic leadership. Leaders should
be more attentive to the individual talents and character of their subordinates and
to the dynamics of team organizations, be they personal staff or interagency com-
mittees. Leaders must also be quick to recognize ineffective performance and
deal with it decisively. This, of course, was one of Churchill’s great gifts. It is not
apparent that these matters should be handled any differently today.12
All this is easily summarized: leadership itself is today the truly forgotten di-
mension of strategy.
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